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JOINT DEFAULT PROBABILITIES AND
COUNTRY RISK
Bert Scholtens and Daphne Hameeteman
SOM-theme E: Financial markets and institutions
Abstract
The assessment of country risk is of crucial importance for both developing countries and
international lenders and investors. Many existing country risk approaches are opaque and
heavily rely on subjective choices. In general, they lack a theoretical basis. To assess country
risk, we use the Merton model in which a loan defaults if the value of a firm’s assets falls
below the amount due to the loan. In a portfolio context, this implies that default correlations
warrant the utmost attention. We find that country default correlations are significant and low.
Furthermore, joint defaults tend to be clustered in Latin American and Eastern European
transition countries, but not in Asia.

11 Introduction
As a consequence of the emerging market crises in the 1980s and 1990s,
and as a result of increasing financial integration, country risk analysis has
become a growing field of interest. Both for the host countries and for
international lenders and investors, it is of crucial importance that the
assessment of country risk takes place on a sound and objective basis.
Transparency and good governance are important conditions for (renewed)
access to international financial markets (Easterly, 2002). In its new guidelines
to promote safety and soundness of the international financial system, the
Basel Committee (2001) suggests to develop sophisticated risk models.
However, there is no standard approach in the financial industry to country
risk analysis. For example, balanced-score cards, ratings, structural models,
interest yields and yield spreads all are used to assess country risk (see
Caouette et al., 1998). Crucial ingredients of risk management practices and
incentives are the correlations of the returns on loans and loan portfolios,
which determine the achievable degree of diversification (Stulz, 1998).
Traditional methods of country risk assessment usually do not comply with
these criteria. Furthermore, they lack a sound theoretical basis. The Basel
Committee emphasizes the significance of the contribution of a default
correlation in portfolio modeling in their guidelines on credit risk modeling:
the more highly default correlated the portfolios, the less portfolio risk will be
reduced when diversification is desired. Our aim is to offer a theoretical basis
2for country risk analysis and to include default correlation in country risk
modelling.
Basically, default correlations are estimated in two ways. The first
approach uses historical data (Lucas, 1995). The problems with this approach
are well known: First, there usually are not enough time-series data available
to accurately estimate country default correlations. Second, it does not use
country-specific information and, therefore, cannot recognize that the default
correlation between, for example, Argentina and Venezuela could be very
different from that between Argentina and the Philippines. Third, default
correlations are time-varying, so past history may not reflect the current
reality. The second approach is based on the work of Merton (1974). His
option-theoretic approach to default considers that equity holders have the
option to sell the firm’s assets rather than to repay the debt if the asset value
gets below the debt value. The basic idea is that loan default occurs if the
market value of the firm’s assets falls below the amount due to the loan.
Within the context of a portfolio of borrowers, the default correlation
measures the strength of the default relationship between two borrowers. It is
constructed using the correlation of the borrowers’ returns, and both
borrowers’ default probabilities. Gersbach and Lipponer (1999) and Li (2000)
use this approach for corporate borrowers. Gordy (2000) and Zhou (2001)
discuss different types of default risk models. We will try to use the second
approach – the Merton model of default risk – for country risk analysis.
Country risk is even more difficult to model than credit risk for several
reasons. First, the lack of a liquid market makes it difficult to price country
risk for a specific obligor and tenor. Second, although countries do present
national accounts, because of valuation issues, these cannot be used in a
3similar ways as the accounts of corporations. Third, countries cannot
technically go into bankruptcy in the way that corporations can. We aim at
developing an alternative method to derive country default correlation on the
basis of models that successfully have been used to assess credit risk. Our
approach fundamentally differs from a previous attempt by Baig and Goldfajn
(1999). They determine a country default correlation by calculating the
correlation between sovereign spreads, where the spread is an indication for
default risk. However, in crisis periods, a significant liquidity premium can get
incorporated into the spread. This psychological factor may disturb the
outcome. Our approach also differs from the one suggested by Cumby and
Pastine (2001). They derive an implied default probability for sovereign bonds
on the basis of the market price of bonds and US Treasury rates. They focus
on different features of each individual bond (such as different coupons,
maturities, amortization schedules, collateral, etc.). As such, Cumby and
Pastine develop a measure of credit risk for (sovereign) bonds, instead of
analyzing country risk. Karmann (2000) uses an option approach to analyze
debt (values) of individual countries. Nordal (2001) applies the real options
approach to include country risk indices in the valuation of investments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the methodology to
derive the country default correlation. In fact, we elaborate upon two
alternatives: the historical default correlation and the expected default
correlation. The asset value is crucial in the Merton model of default risk. As
such, section 3 argues why foreign exchange reserves are used as our proxy
for a country’s assets. Section 4 discusses the dataset. Section 5 gives the
results of our analysis. Section 6 concludes.
42. Methodology
This section goes into the methodology used for constructing a country
default correlation coefficient (CDC). This correlation coefficient is an
attribute of a pair of countries, signaling the extent to which these two
countries are in default at the same moment in time. A correlation of 1
indicates that if country X defaults, country Y does too. Two different
approaches are used to derive the country default correlation coefficient and
we will compare the two throughout the remainder of this paper. The first
approach is based on a statistical analysis of past default events: the historical
default correlation. The second approach is based on a country pair’s asset
correlation and expected default frequency: the expected default correlation.
2.1 Default correlation
Consider two random variables D1(t) and D2(t) that describe the default
status of two countries, country 1 and country 2, over a given time horizon t:
Di(t) = 1 if country i defaults by t,
0 otherwise.
Assuming the independence of default events, the joint default probability
of the two countries is P(D1(t) =1 and D2(t) =1) = P (D1(t) =1) * P (D2(t) =1).
When examining the joint probability, however, it is reasonable to assume that
when one country defaults, the other country may have a higher likelihood of
5defaulting. Thus, the two countries may have a positive default correlation.









Because D1(t) and D2(t) are Bernoulli binomial random variables, we have
E [Di(t)] = P (Di(t) = 1),
Var [Di(t)] = P (Di(t) = 1) x [ 1 - P (Di(t) = 1)].
From Equation (1), we have
P(D1(t) =1 and D2(t) =1) = E [D1(t) * D2(t))
= E [D1(t)] * E [D2(t)] + + Corr [D1(t),D2(t))]
(Var [D1(t)] * Var [D2(t)])½ . (2)
For example, if P (D1(t) = 1) = E[D1(t)] = 10% (i.e., country 1 has a
10% probability of default), and P (D2(t) = 1) = E [D2(t)] = 2%, the joint
default probability of both countries, assuming their independence, is 10% *
2% = 0.2%. However, if the default correlation equals 0.3, the joint
probability of country default would equal 1.5%. The latter is more than 7
times as large as the former. Thus, default correlation can have a large impact
on the probability of joint default events.
6Of course, we are well aware of the fact that the correlation coefficient
is a rough indicator. It is a measure for the association of random variables that
are more or less continuous. One may doubt this assumption in the present
case. The underlying phenomenon of default is rather opaque as it can be
operationalized in many ways. Moreover, the coefficient is symmetric with
regard to two countries. However, these drawbacks do not relate specifically to
country defaults. As our aim is to formally analyze country risk with a method
that is widely used in analyzing credit risk, we will leave them aside for the
time being.
2.2 Historical default correlation
This approach is based on a statistical analysis of past default events.
To this extent, we return to Equation (1). To solve for Corr [D1(t),D2(t))], we
need E [D1(t) * D2(t)]. With this first approach, the joint default probability is
calculated as the number of years in which two countries are in default,
divided by the total number of years in the sample period, minus 1. This can
be estimated directly from our observations.
The second term in Equation (1), E [D1(t)] * E [D2(t)], represents the
probability of joint country default when the default events are uncorrelated.
By unraveling the numerator, we know that the correlation is positive when
the probability of joint default (E [D1(t) * D2(t)]) is greater than E [D1(t)] * E
[D2(t)], and negative when the probability of joint default is less than E [D1(t)]
* E [D2(t)]. As such, we have a very straightforward approach to country
7default correlation. The problems with this approach are well known (see
Zhou, 2001). Most important is that usually there are not enough time-series
data available to accurately estimate the default correlations. Furthermore, the
default correlations are time-varying, so past history may not reflect the
current reality, let alone the reality of expectations regarding the future. Our
second approach aims at dealing with both these two shortcomings.
2.3 Expected default correlation
In section 2.2, we based the country default correlation on historical
default data. In this section, we use a transformation model. This model is
based on KMV (1998) and Gersbach and Lipponer (1999). The former
calculate the default correlation between two borrowers. Gersbach and
Lipponer (1999) specify this model in their study on how to determine
correlations of bank loan defaults. This literature is based on the work of
Merton (1974). According to Merton (1974), loan default occurs if the market
value of the firm’s assets falls below the amount due to the loan. The default
correlation measures the strength of the default relationship between two
borrowers. The default correlation between two borrowers is constructed with
use of the correlation of the borrowers’ returns, and both borrowers’ default
probabilities.
The model we use here is, just like the historical default correlation,
based on Equation (1). The main difference is that the variables in the equation
are to be calculated in quite a different manner: In this second approach, the
8default correlation between two countries depends on the joint default
probability and their expected default frequencies. These can be derived as
follows. We start with defining the default event:
D1,t = 1 if A1,t-1 * (1 + R1,t ) < L1,t ,
0 otherwise.
Where D1,t is the default event of country 1 in period t, A1,t-1 the asset
value of country 1 at the end of period t-1, R1,t – calculated as (A1,t – A1,t-1 ) /
A1,t-1 – the asset growth of country 1 in period t, and L1,t is the critical value of
country 1 in period t. The expected default frequency (EDF) is defined as
EDF1,t = P[A1,t-1 * (1 + R1,t ) < L1,t ] = Φ[ ε1,t < c1,t ] (3)
Where EDF1,t is the default probability, and Φ[ ] is the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution with ε1,t as an error term and c1,t as
a critical value below which the country defaults. The probability under the
critical value is equal to the EDF. Consequently, by knowing the EDF, we can
define a country’s critical value c1,t.
With a joint default event, we need the default points of both defaulting
countries. The joint default probability (JDP) indicates the probability that the
relevant assets of country 1 and 2 fall below their individual default points (or
critical values), indicated by:
9],[)2,1(
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By implementing the asset correlation between two countries and both
their EDF’s, we are able to calculate their joint default probability. The
expected default correlation (EDC) is given in equation (5):










Here, the EDFi (expected default frequency) is similar to Di(t) (default
probability), and the JDP (1, 2) (joint default probability) has the same
meaning as E [D1(t) * D2(t)]. However, recall that Di(t) is based on historical
default events. As to the expected default correlation, we derive the default
probabilities (or EDF’s) from country ratings, published by renowned rating
agencies. The EDF indicates the probability of default within one year, in line
with the ratings. Ratings are an important independent variable in credit
models (see Caouette et al., 1998). Rating changes are significantly correlated
with changes in default rates (Okashima and Fridson, 2000).
To summarize, with the historical default correlation, we calculate E
[D1(t) * D2(t)] on the basis of historical default events. With the expected
default correlation, the joint default probability is constructed on the basis of,
first, the asset correlation and, second, the expected default frequency of two
countries.
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3. Foreign Exchange Reserves as Country Assets
The assets of a country are a key variable in the methodology
discussed in the previous section. However, this variable is a rather abstract
notion. Unlike a company, a country hardly has any assets that can be
liquidated in case of default as it most of the time has no direct access to the
securities, investments, etc. of its inhabitants. Therefore, we have to come up
with a proxy. To this extent, one can consider a country’s assets in an
international context from two different perspectives (Krugman and Obstfeld,
1997). First is the country’s means of generating (export) earnings (for
example, production capacity and natural resources). However, the sovereign
seldom has direct access to this component. Therefore, this approach is not
very fruitful within the context of this paper. Second is the international
liquidity of a country, for a large part consisting of the foreign exchange
reserves that are held by the country. It exactly is this item that is within the de
facto control of the sovereign. Therefore, we opt for the foreign exchange
reserves as our proxy for the assets of a country. Data on foreign exchange
reserves generally are widely available and are provided on a short-term notice
by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.
The foreign exchange reserves (FXR) of a country will generally
decline to a certain ‘critical level’ before the country will default. The ability
of a country to repay its foreign debt depends on both the solvency and
liquidity of the country (see Eaton et al., 1986). Unlike insolvency, illiquidity
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is directly observable by looking at the direct usable reserves of a country,
which consist of the foreign exchange reserves. Other macro economic
variables, such as for example GDP-growth or inflation rate, lack the direct
connection with country default and, in our opinion, are no suitable candidates
to act as a proxy for a country’s assets. The importance of the FXR for a
country’s ‘well-being’ is also underlined by others. For example, Feldstein
(1999) argues that liquidity is the key to self-protection against the devastating
effects of crises. A country that has substantial international liquidity, i.e. large
foreign exchange reserves, is less likely to be subject to country default given
the fact it wishes to maintain a fixed exchange rate (Krugman and Obstfeld,
1997).
In all, we feel it is justified to take the foreign exchange reserves
(FXR) as a proxy for a country’s assets. Consequently, R1,t from Equation (3)
above will represent the growth of the FXR of country A. We assume that
FXR growth is normally distributed. On the basis of the FXR (growth)
correlation between two countries, and their expected default frequencies
(derived from published country ratings), we can calculate the joint default
probability. By substituting this JDP in Equation (5), we calculate the country
default correlation (section 5).
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4. Data
We selected 37 countries (see Appendix A.1). These countries are
included in the IMF’s classifications of “developing countries”, “countries in
transition”, and the advanced economies of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of
China and Japan. We selected the countries on the basis of the availability of
monthly data of foreign exchange reserves and of their country ratings, as
published by Standard & Poor’s and the Institutional Investor. We analyze a
period of 29 years: 1970-1998. This period includes three major emerging
market crises: the 1982 debt crisis, the 1994 balance of payments crisis, and
the 1997/1998 Asia crisis. Our 29-year period includes 249 country default
events. We obtained these records from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and
Salomon Brothers. They include private lending – through bonds, suppliers’
credits or bank loans - to sovereign nations. S&P defines default as the failure
to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified
grace period) contained in the original terms of the debt issue. Salomon
Brothers identifies extended periods (six months or more) where all or part of
interest and/or principal payments due were reduced or rescheduled. Although
these definitions slightly differ, we feel free to combine them to a single
country default dataset. The end of each period of default or rescheduling was
recorded when full payments were resumed or when a restructuring was
agreed upon. Periods of default or rescheduling within five years of each other
were combined. We are aware of the fact that a disadvantage of this approach
is that default periods can become very extended. Figure 1 gives the
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distribution of the 249 country default events of the 37 countries during 1970-
1998. Figure 1 shows that the number of country defaults exploded in the early
1980s. It gradually fell in the 1990s. The foreign exchange reserves data used
in this study are derived from the IMF (International Financial Statistics),
both yearly and monthly data (IFS-line 11.d).
Figure 1: Number of country defaults of 37 countries (see Appendix
A.1), 1970-1998
To calculate a country’s default probability, we use the country rating lists
of the rating agencies Standard and Poor’s (alphabetical, from CC to AAA,











































100, with 100 indicating no risk) (see Trevino and Thomas, 2000). On the
basis of research by Oliver, Wyman & Company, we assign a default
probability to every S&P-rating. The S&P ratings only go back to 1992.
Therefore we need the Institutional Investor (I.I) ratings as they go back until
1978 (Ul Haque et al., 1996). We match the S&P ratings on those of the I.I to
cover a time period, as large as possible, for which we need the country
default probabilities. Matching is done with an ordered dependent variable
model. Within this model, we use the ordered logit method, as this has the
least sum square errors. Within the numerical I.I rating, we calculate 19
categories for which every I.I category exactly matches one of the S&P-
ratings. The ratings in the period 1970-1977 are equalized to those of 1978.
The rating data are summarized in Appendix A.2. The ratings (and, therefore,
the EDF’s too) concern a period of one year.
5. Results
First, we present the results of our country default correlation
calculations between 37 countries worldwide, for the period 1970-1998. Then,
we go into the question whether the expected default correlation is better
suited for practical use than the historical default correlation.
Method 1: Historical default correlation
We start by calculating the historical country default correlation (HDC)
from a sample of 37 countries. From these 37, according to the S&P and
Salomon Brothers reports, nine countries did not default during 1970-1998,
namely China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Japan, Malaysia,
15
Singapore and Slovakia. As such, we will not include them in our analysis
(implementing it – Di(t) = 0 in equation (1) – would result in an impracticable
solution). Consequently, 28 countries remain, of which 378 country pairs
({[28*28]-28}/ 2) are formed. In Appendix A.3, the default correlations of
these pairs are presented. Table 1 displays the basic characteristics of the
historical default correlations. We could detect (regional) clusters of countries
that are mutually connected by joint default. Especially, we found such a
cluster of Latin American countries (average HDC among this group was
0.539). There was no such clustering for Eastern European or Asian countries
(average HDC 0.0465 and –0.129 respectively).














total 0.229 1.000 -0.608 0.364 378
total (positive) 0.461 1.000 0.008 0.229 241
HDC ≤ 0 -0.177 -0.008 -0.608 0.114 137
0 ≤ HDC ≤ 0.25 0.139 0.245 0.008 0.068 49
0.25 ≤ HDC ≤ 0.50 0.386 0.498 0.256 0.071 86
0.50 ≤ HDC ≤ 1.00 0.670 1.000 0.506 0.131 106
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Of the total results, 137 negative values emerged. We distinct between
‘total’- and ‘total positive’ values of the total sample, for two reasons. First, a
negative value is hard to interpret. An example in which it is somewhat
imaginable that this situation could occur is between two oil-exporters, A and
B. If country A defaults, country B would enjoy an enlargement in its market.
This might lead to an increase in income for country B. Secondly, negative
values influence the average of the complete matrix strongly.
Method 2: Expected default correlation
Now, we calculate the expected default correlation (EDC) figures for
the total 666 country pairs ({[37*37]-37}/ 2) over the period 1970-1998. For
this method, we need a country asset correlation, and both countries’ default
probabilities. For the asset correlation between the country pairs, we correlated
the monthly FXR growth. As such, we use 348 (29*12) observations to
calculate the asset correlation for each country pair. Appendix A.4 gives the
expected default correlations for all country pairs. The key characteristics of
the EDCs are in table 2. This default correlation also produces many negative
values: 39% of all country pairs has a negative EDC. Table 2 categorizes the
total positive values. The most striking feature of this table is the overall low
values of default correlation: the average default correlation of the total sample
is 0.006 (positives: 0.013), and the largest correlation value is 0.163. Note,
however, that these default correlations are in the same order of magnitude as
the corporate default correlations (KMV, 1998). As with method 1, we could
detect clusters of countries that are mutually connected by joint default. Once
again, it appears that Latin America is a significant cluster. Latin American
countries have an average expected default correlation of 0.008. Also, the
17
EDC of the Eastern European transition economies show a slight mutual
connection as their average default correlation coefficient is 0.020. For the
Asian economies, we find only a very small average EDC, namely 0.001.










Total 0.006 0.163 -0.046 0.018 666
total (positive) 0.013 0.163 0.000 0.019 405
MDC ≤ 0 -0.006 -0.00006 -0.046 0.007 261
0 ≤ MDC ≤
0.05
0.010 0.048 0.000 0.011 386
0.05 ≤ MDC ≤
0.10
0.066 0.092 0.051 0.011 16
0.10 ≤ MDC ≤
0.20
0.136 0.163 0.117 0.024 3
We may wonder whether the correlation results in Appendix A.4 are in
fact not too low. To this extent, we need to elaborate on the significance of the
correlation coefficient, notably a default correlation. In this respect, it is
important to determine the degrees of freedom. Remember that we calculated
the asset correlation needed for the EDC, over a period of 29 years, between
the monthly FXR-growth data. This means that we use 348 observations to
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calculate the EDC. Therefore, statistically, a correlation of 0.163 (the
maximum value in table 2), with 346 (348-2) degrees of freedom, is
significant at a 1%-level (the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected).
This means that a significant positive correlation does occur indeed. However,
note that the EDC is not equal to an ordinary Pearson correlation coefficient as
it is ‘created’ by the two default probabilities and an asset correlation.
Therefore, we must be very careful with the interpretation of the correlation’s
significance.
In the remainder of this section, we compare the two methods. As such,
five differences stand out. First, the historical default data on average show
higher levels of default correlation, and a larger spread and standard deviation.
Secondly, with historical data, a default correlation only can be established
when the countries in question actually default in the sample period.
Therefore, no default correlation could be calculated for 288 country pairs. For
the approach based on the Merton model, this is not a problem. Furthermore,
both methods produce many negative default correlations: 36% and 39% of
the sample for the historical defaults and the expected defaults respectively. In
case of a negative correlation, we assume that no default relation exists
between the two countries in question. From this, we conclude that the
Merton-based approach leads to a much broader data range than the approach
that is purely based on historical data. A third difference is that with the
historical approach, strict assumptions must be made to come up with the
default correlation. For example, we only count the years in default, even if a
country defaulted for 7 months. This also means that we are highly dependent
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on the period focussed on. A short period, for instance 10 years, is less likely
to include enough default events to produce default correlations between X
country pairs, than when we focus on a period of 100 years. In contrast, the
Merton-based approach can produce default correlations for every test period
one prefers, as long as plausible asset correlations and default probabilities are
available. Fourth, in using the historical default correlation, one is highly
dependent on the political situation in a country. A country can be ‘selectively’
in default, which relates to ‘unwillingness’ to pay. This does not mean that the
country is not capable to pay other creditors. With the Merton-based approach,
we assume that a country defaults when its “assets” decrease until under a
certain critical point. Fifth is the period of time to which the default correlation
relates. The level of correlation relates to the probability of two countries
defaulting in the same time period. For the expected country default
correlation, this time period refers to one year, as the default probabilities may
change in the next year. In contrast, the historical default correlation is not
restricted to this kind of time limit. Basically, it is workable in every time
period one might wish to use. If country B defaults two years after country A
does, it could still be due to the default event of country A: i.e. strong default
correlation. However, it can be doubted whether it is recommendable to use
the correlation figure for an indefinite long period of time. Economic and
political developments worldwide make it quite unrealistic to assume that the
relations based on historical events will continue to remain exactly the same.
From these differences, we conclude that with the Merton-based approach, we
may derive superior information in relation to relying purely on historical data.
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1.1.1 6. Conclusion
For developing countries, it is of huge importance to get assessed on a
proper and transparent basis. Many existing country risk approaches lack
transparency. The aim of this paper is to give country risk analysis a sound
theoretical basis. To this extent, we depart from the work of Merton (1974). In
his model, loan default occurs if the market value of a firm’s assets falls below
the amount due to the loan. Within the context of a portfolio, default
correlation is a crucial ingredient of the model. As a proxy for the asset value
of a country, we use foreign exchange reserves. We suggested two ways in
which to derive country default correlations. One is on the basis of historical
default data, the other is on the basis of expected default frequencies and joint
default probabilities. We compared the two approaches on the basis of a
dataset for 37 countries for which we analyzed defaults during 1970-1998.
We found small but significant country default correlations. The
correlations were in the same order of magnitude as those for corporate
borrowers. We detected clusters of countries that are mutually connected by
joint defaults, Latin American countries being the clearest case. However, we
could not detect clustering with Asian countries. It appears that a country’s
foreign exchange reserves serve rather well as a proxy for a country’s assets.
We found interesting differences between the two approaches. The expected
default correlation presented significantly smaller values than the historical
default correlation. Furthermore, it allowed us to produce a figure for any
country pair, whereas the historical default approach could only produce
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correlation data in case both countries actually default during the sample
period. Although the historical default method is not restricted to any time
limit, it is not recommendable to use the correlation figure for an indefinite
long period of time, due to changes in the economic and political environment.
Updating the historical default correlation would be impractical given the
limited amount of observable country defaults and the large periods between
these defaults. In all, we may conclude that the option-theoretic approach
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